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￿The origins of the thoughts in this essay go back to my graduate lectures on the history
of economic thought and philosophy in the early 1990s. I tried, then, to structure my lectures
unconventionally, by focusing on the ￿ philosophy of science￿ contributions of Smith ([16]),
Jevons ([6]) and Keynes ([10]), but also on their contributions as representatives of classical,
neoclassical and modern economic theory. This mode and focus gave me a fulcrum around
which I was able to tell the story of the development of economic thought against a backdrop
of the evolution of the philosophy of science, mathematical logic and mathematics. However,
the decisive impulse to embark on this study emerged after reading Bob Clower￿ s Presidential
Address to the Southern Economic Association ([3]) in early 1993. That inspired this journey
towards this Jevonian odyssey. I am greatly indebted to Bob Clower and John McCall for
the early inspirations and consistent encouragements, over many intervening years. They,
however, are absolved from all responsibilities for the remaining errors and infelicities.
yvela.velupillai@nuigalway.ie or kvelupillai@gmail.com
1Abstract
In this paper I try to substantiate the thesis that Jevons may have been
too harsh on the vices of induction and generously optimistic about the virtues
of deduction, as discussed, primarily, in his magnum opus, The Principles of
Science [6]. With this aim in mind the paper attempts to suggest (modern),
recursion theoretic, theoretical technologies that could reduce and, under con-
ditions that I claim would be acceptable to Jevons, even eliminate the inductive
indeterminacies that he had emphasised.
Key Words: Jevons, Inductiion, Inductive Inference, Bayes￿ s Rule
JEL Classi￿cations: B16, B31, C11, C63
21 Introduction
"Doubtless there is in nature some invariably acting mechanism,
such that from some ￿xed conditions an invariable result always
emerges. But we, with our ￿nite minds and short experience, can
never penetrate the mystery of these existences .... . We are in the
position of spectators who witness the production of a complicated
machine, but are not allowed to examine its structure. We learn what
does happen and what does appear, but if we ask for the reason, the
answer would involve an in￿nite depth of mystery."
[6], p.222; italics added.
William Stanley Jevons, a pioneer of neoclassical economics was implaca-
bly opposed to the inductive method. His methodological precepts against the
inductive method were cogently presented in his monumental treatise on The
Principles of Science1 (ibid, henceforth referred to as TPOS). However, a close
reading of its almost 800 pages, against the backdrop of some knowledge of the
principles underpinning the MDL principle has convinced me that the Jevonian
opposition to the inductive method is untenable. In this paper I attempt a re-
interpretation of TPOS as a treatise supporting what I has, in recent writings,
been called The Modern Theory of Induction (cf. [20]).
TPOS, a book of almost 800 dense pages refers to almost every known West-
ern natural philosopher without, however, a single mention of William of Ock-
ham, Occam￿ s Razor or Ockham￿ s Principle2! The closest he gets to anything
like a (dismissive) mention of Occam￿ s Razor is when he rejects Newton￿ s Rule 1
for Natural Philosophy in the Principia as irrelevant for any inductive purpose,
let alone for acting as an anchor to eliminate inductive indeterminacy:
"It is by false generalisation, again, that the laws of nature have been
supposed to possess that perfection which we attribute to simple
1It is a striking fact that Adam Smith, Stanley Jevons and Maynard Keynes , who each
developed a distinct framework of economic analysis, were also codi￿ers and innovators in the
philosophy of science. Smith￿ s History of Astronomy ([16] and, for a ￿ne and comprehensive
essay on this important work by Adam Smith, see also [12]) was, after all, an early attempt at
codifying a framework to study the epistemology of scienti￿c practice; Jevons￿ s TPOS could
even be read as a distant forerunner of Popper￿ s Logik der Forschung, as emphasised, correctly
I believe, by Mays ([13]), at least from a methodological point of view. As for Keynes, the
Treatise on Probability (cf. [10]) and its methodological and epistemological place in the
philosophy of science in general, and in the philosophy of economics in particular, has been
so well mined that any comment at this juncture would be totally super￿uous. But in the
context of this paper, it may be useful to point out that this in￿uential book by Keynes was
instrumental in the development of one strand of recursion theoretic induction, the theoretical
technology which I harness in §3, below (cf. [17] and [18]).
2The general literature seems to refer to William of Ockham but Occam￿ s Razor; hence I
retain this schizophrenia in my own spelling. Furthermore, Ockham￿ s own most often stated
version of the principle named after him seems to have been: ￿ Pluralitas non est ponenda
sine necessitae￿ ￿ ￿ plurality is not to be posited without necessity￿ . The more commonly
attributed version: ￿ Entia non sunt multiplicanda sine necessitate￿￿ ￿ entities must not be
multiplied without necessity￿￿appears not to have been used by him (cf. [2], p.xxi).
3forms and relations. ... Newton seemed to adopt the questionable
axiom that nature always proceeds in the simplest way; in stating
his ￿rst rule of philosophising, he adds: ￿ To this purpose the philoso-
phers say, that nature does nothing in vain, when less will serve; for
nature is pleased with simplicity, and a⁄ects not the pomp of su-
per￿ uous causes.￿ ..... Simplicity is naturally agreeable to a mind of
limited powers, but to an in￿nite mind all things are simple."
TPOS, p.625; italics added.
Is Jevons suggesting, in the context of his times, beliefs and traditions, that
the omnipotence and omniscience of the architect of the laws of nature ￿the
designer of the ￿ complicated machine￿￿are such that we are as likely to witness
the ￿ productions of a complicated machine￿as to a simple one3. Jevons may have
been trying to make the point that Newton￿ s was a metaphysical assumption and
that we have no grounds for assuming anything about structure in the absence
of empirical evidence to the contrary4. However, Jevons, who was almost as
obsessed with consistency, as he was with deduction5, did not obey his own
precepts when it came to choosing the order and degree of equations to ￿t
observed data. In such an example he argues clearly in favour of choosing the
simplest hypothesis, at least in the ￿rst instance:
"It is a general rule in quantitative investigation that we commence
by discovering linear, and afterwards proceed to elliptic or more
complicated laws of variation."
TPOS, p.474; italics added.
Perhaps, given the times and context, one can be generous to Jevons ￿more
generous than he was to Newton and more, also, than Marshall was to Jevons ￿
and suggest that he was doubtful about any reliance on Occam￿ s Razor because
he did not feel it possible to give a rigorous, invariant, analytical de￿nition of
simplicity. I think, therefore, it may be reasonable to assume, counterfactually,
that Jevons would have accepted the use of Occam￿ s Razor in hypothesis se-
lection and inductive inference, had it been possible to demonstrate that it was
possible to de￿ne, rigorously, the notion of simplicity.
After developments in the recursion-theoretic approach to induction, re-
reading Jevons and substantiating a rigorous method of inductive inference is
3I cannot but re￿ect on Einstein￿ s wise maxim when faced with the Great Scorer￿ s devises,
￿ Subtle is the Lord, but malicious he is not￿ ￿ Ra¢ niert ist der Herrgott aber botshaft ist
er nicht ￿ and wish Jevons had shown some humility in the face of Einstein￿ s undisputed
predecessor￿ s, i.e., Newton￿ s, own methodological maxims.
4The Einsteinian example of the way he reasoned his way towards the general theory of
relativity from the special theory is clearly described and discussed by Kemeny, [9]. This
example is paradigmatic, of the role of simplicity in hypothesis selection and formation, in
the logic of scienti￿c practice.
5He would, surely, ￿nd it uncomfortable to live in a post-G￿delian world where consistency
￿ in the Hilbertian sense ￿ has been dethroned from its crowning place in the deductive
enterprise!
4not the most di¢ cult task for a philosophy of science. This will be attempted,
in §3, after ￿rst summarising the Jevonian vision of inductive indeterminacy in
the next section. The concluding section tries to draw the threads together and
suggest a general interpretation of why Jevons may have been less critical of the
possibilities for formalising, rigorously, an inductive logic.
In the rest of this introductory section, I outline some general thoughts on
Jevonian mathematical and logical methodologies, just to set the themes in the
paper in some context.
Collison Black has persuasively argued that Jevons was a ￿ transitional ￿gure
in both economic theory and economic policy￿ . (cf., [4], in particular, p. 163, ⁄).
It is my thesis that he was also a transitional ￿gure in the two ￿elds that formed
the leitmotifs of TPOS. His central theme in this massive work, the logic of the
scienti￿c method, was very much a transitional subject for almost the whole of
the period during which Jevons was involved in it; his secondary theme, the
role of applied mathematics6 as hilfenkonstruktion, to set in its paces the main
theme, was also a transitional subject ￿in the sense in which it was used by
Collison Black ￿but, perhaps, less intensively so in Jevons￿ s own lifetime.
In the former case, Jevons was, in his own opinion - substantiated by exten-
sive and impressive work7 ￿a follower of the revolutionary movements in logic
started by Boole and De Morgan. But, unfortunately, the period between 1847
- the year that Boole and De Morgan published their foundational works - and
1979, the year that saw the publication of Frege￿ s Begri⁄sschrift, was a classic
transition period. Even the second edition of TPOS ￿published in 1877 ￿came
too early to be in￿ uenced by the currents that were set in motion by Frege.
Similarly, in applied and pure mathematics, the arithmetization of analysis
and the various foundational axiomatizations, as well as emerging developments
in applied mathematics ￿ particularly in the theory of di⁄erential equations
at the hands of Peano, PoincarØ and Rayleigh8 ￿were to make the Jevonian
analytic apparatus obsolete even as they were being fashioned. For example,
Jevons￿ s almost monomaniacal faith in the linear superposition principle to un-
derstand forced vibrations between two (implicitly) coupled linear oscillators
led him to absurdities in theorising about the so-called decennial cycle in eco-
nomic activity. This naive theory came to be known as the ￿ sunspot theory of
the cycle￿ , although the Jevonian basis for it was abandoned in formal business
cycle theory (and a Pigovian underpinning came to be substituted). Almost si-
multaneously as Jevons was trying to extract impossible dynamics from coupled
and forced linear oscillators, Lord Rayleigh was changing the landscape of the
theory of oscillations by beginning the imaginative experimental study of forced
nonlinear oscillators. The point to be emphasised, in a Jevonian sense, is that
oscillators of the Rayleigh-type show that the period of the forcing term need
6In particular, probability theory, the techniques of permutations and combinations and
the theory of di⁄erential equations.
7See for example the extremely interesting essays in [7], particularly Part I.
8Marshall, for example, was more tuned to some of these developments, and so was Walras.
The former had been Second Wrangler at the Mathematical Tripos in Cambridge to Rayleigh;
the latter had considerable knowledge of Picard￿ s work in di⁄erential equations.
5not bear any meaningful analytical or discoverable relation with the period or
amplitude of the forced oscillator.
These contextual observations substantiate my main point that Jevons was,
unfortunately, a transitional ￿gure ￿not only in economic theory and economic
policy. I suppose, however, all pioneers are inevitably transitional ￿gures be-
cause they initiate currents that are tamed and channelled by followers who are
able to see further because they were ￿ standing on the shoulders of giants￿ , as
Newton famously and humbly ￿ confessed￿ . The issues that Jevons considered
crucial for the formalization of inductive inference remain current; their resolu-
tions came about by followers of the pioneers who saw further by standing on
the shoulders of the pioneers.
2 The Jevonian Vision on Induction and its In-
determinacy
"What especially characterised Jevons￿ s view of logical method was
the prominence he attached to the combination of formal and empir-
ical principles through the inverse application of the theory of prob-
ability"
[8], p.638; italics added
I shall summarise, rather telegraphically ￿but with exact references to the
source in TPOS ￿Jevons￿ s precepts on inductive inference. This will, then,
enable me to refer to them conveniently in the next section when a simple case
is made to encapsulate the Jevonian vision in the modern inductive fold.
The following discussion summarises, however audacious the task of encap-
sulating summarily a sustained criticism of the inductive method, spread over
a discursive book of almost 800 pages (all quotes in this list are from TPOS),
the Jevonian vision of induction.
Jevons acknowledges, explicitly, that the theory of inductive inference in
TPOS was ￿ suggested by [his] study of the Inverse Method of Probability￿(p.265)
and that, therefore, his working hypothesis is that induction is, formally, the in-
verse operation of deduction (p.121). Furthermore, he de￿nes perfect induction
as follows (pp. 146-7):
De￿nition 1 If all possible instances of the phenomenon under consideration is
enumerable, then induction is de￿ned to be perfect; it is de￿ned to be imperfect
if enumeration is infeasible
Remark 2 I shall assume that enumerability here refers to the formal mathe-
matical notion; i.e, at most denumerably in￿nite9.
9Thus the number of instances of any inductive phenomenon is, at most, denumerably
in￿nite; and the number of alternative hypotheses that may be entertained to account for any
given inductive phenomenon is also, at most, denumerably in￿nite.
6These de￿nitions imply, for Jevons, that the results of imperfect induction
are never more than probable:
"Only in proportion as our induction approximates to the character
of perfect induction, does it approximate to certainty. The amount
of uncertainty corresponds to the probability that other objects than
those examined may exist and falsify our inferences; ...".
(p.229; italics added)
Next, Jevons suggests the deductive disciplining criteria for inductive processes.
First of all, inductive processes are those, and only those, that generate gen-
eral laws such that the hypothesis underlying them ￿ yield deductive results in
accordance with experience￿(pp. 226-8):
"That process only can be called induction which gives general laws,
and it is by the subsequent employment of deduction that we antici-
pate particular events. .... I hold that in all cases of inductive infer-
ence we must invent hypotheses, until we fall upon some hypotheses
which yields deductive results in accordance with experience."
Secondly, the extraction - i.e., inference - of such general laws, from a de-
numerably in￿nite set of plausible hypotheses, proceeds by way of applying the
￿ inverse method of probability￿(i.e., using Bayes￿ s Rule):
"[I]n all cases ... of inductive inference where we seem to pass from
some particular instances to a new instance, we ... form an hypothe-
sis as to the logical conditions under which the given instances might
occur; we calculate inversely the probability of that hypothesis and
compounding this with the probability that a new instance would
proceed from the same conditions, we gain the absolute probability
of occurrence of the new instance in virtue of this hypothesis. But as
several, or many, or even an in￿nite number of mutually inconsistent
hypothesis may be possible, we must repeat the calculation for each
such conceivable hypothesis, and then the complete probability of
the future instances will be the sum of the separate probabilities."
(p.268)
It is clear, therefore, that Jevons￿ s inductive method, despite its rhetoric
about being simply ￿ the inverse of deduction￿ , is nothing other than a simple
Bayesian procedure.
Up to this point there is nothing controversial; Jevons does not even try to
suggest that induction or inductive inference is formally impossible. Next come
the two assertions that seem to have stamped the Jevonian authority on the
impossibility ￿or the indeterminacy ￿of formal, i.e., mechanical, induction or
inductive inference.
First of all, he observes (con￿dently) that there is no rule or uniform principle
on the basis of which it is possible to assign priors to implement ￿ the inverse
7method of probability￿in the mechanical way in which deductive rules can be
applied:
"To assign the antecedent probability of any proposition, may be a
matter of di¢ culty or impossibility, and one with which logic and
the theory of probability have little concern."
(p.211-2)
Next, there is one of his famous impossibility of induction propositions:
"All logical inference involves classi￿cation [and it] is not really dis-
tinct from the process of perfect induction. [But] there will be no
royal road to the discovery of the best system [of logical inference]
and it will even be impossible to lay down the rules of procedure to
assist those who are in search of good arrangement."
(pp.673-90; italics added)
The Ramean Tree (pp.702-3), is an encapsulation of the ￿ exhaustive method
of classi￿cation￿ .
3 Disciplining Jevonian Inductive Indetermina-
cies with Computable Induction10
"[T]he most probable cause of an event which has happened is that
which would most probably lead to the even supposing the cause to
exist."
TPOS, p.243; italics added.
I claim that ￿ most probable￿ , in the above Jevonian sense of being encap-
sulated within the inverse probability framework, is equivalent to the precise
recursion theoretic inductive inference concept of simplest and it removes, e⁄ec-
tively, the much vaunted indeterminacy of induction. The fundamental notion
of the modern theory or recursion theoretic induction can be stated as the fol-
lowing proposition:
Proposition 3 An event with the highest probability of occurring is also that
which has the simplest description
Let me give a brief and elementary sketch of the kind of analysis that makes
such an equivalence possible ￿i.e., to be able to use Occam￿ s Razor to eliminate
10For the technical literature on the theoretical technology I am using in this section, see
[15], [21] and [1]. The ￿rst is the original source; the second an excellent pedagogical exposition
and the third updates developments and brings the reader to the frontiers of the subject.
8the indeterminacy in the ￿ inverse probability￿method, correctly identi￿ed by




i P (EjHi)P (Hi)
(1)
Where, apart from absolutely standard, textbook interpretations of all vari-
ables and notations, the only implicit novelty ￿for a Jevonian vision ￿ is the
assumption of a denumerable in￿nity of hypotheses. This, in a standard inverse
probability exercise, E, the class of ￿ observed￿events, and P(Hi) are given;
Jevons￿ s inductive inference problem is, then, to ￿nd the ￿ most probable￿Hi
that would ￿ most probably￿lead to the observed event of relevance. To get the
perspective I want, rewrite (1) as:
￿logP (HijE) = ￿logP (EjHi) ￿ logP (Hi) + logP(E) (2)
where the last term on the r.h.s of (2) is a shorthand expression for the
denominator in (1) which, in turn, is the normalising factor in such inverse
probability exercises.
Now, ￿nding the Jevonian ￿ most probable hypothesis￿is equivalent to de-
termining that Hi, w.r.t which (2) is minimised. However, in (4), logP(E) is
invariant w.r.t Hi; hence the problem is to minimise (w.r.t., Hi) :
￿logP (EjHi) ￿ logP (Hi) (3)
However, it is clear that the problem of indeterminacy remains so long as
we do not have a principle on the basis of which the prior cannot be assigned
universally.
Recall, now, that the Jevonian inductive enterprise is supposed to interpret
a class of observations, events, data, etc., ￿￿ the production of a complicated
machine￿￿in terms of a denumerable in￿nity of hypotheses, in such a way that
a general law is formalised from which, by deductive processes, the outcomes
with which one began are generated. These entities are formalised ￿in pre-set
theoretic days ￿in terms of logical and mathematical formulas. As far as the
requirements of the logic of the inductive method recommended in TPOS is
concerned, we need only formalise, at most, a denumerable in￿nity of outcomes
in an observation space, and there is a similar quantitative upper bound for the
number of hypotheses. Thus the space of computable numbers is su¢ cient for
this formalisation exercise.
Suppose, now, that every element in the outcome space and every potential
hypothesis ￿being denumerably in￿nite ￿is associated with a positive integer,
perhaps ordered lexicographically. In TPOS every outcome and every hypothe-
sis is framed as a logical proposition. Every such proposition can, therefore, be
assigned one of the computable numbers and they, in turn, can be processed,
say, by a Turing Machine. Next, the binary codes for the assigned computable
numbers can be constructed, and thereby they can also be given a precise quanti-
tative measure in terms of their counts in bits. Thus the basic result of modern
recursion theoretic inductive inference, summarised in the above proposition,
results from the following Rissanen Rule of MDL Inductive Inference:
9Proposition 4 Rule of Induction11
The ￿ best theory￿is that which minimizes the sum of:
(a). The length, in bits, of the number theoretic representation of the denu-
merable in￿nity of hypothesis;
(b). The length, in bits, of the elements of the space of outcomes (also, by
assumption, at most, denumerably in￿nite);
The conceptual justi￿cation for this ￿ rule￿as the underpinning for Proposi-
tion 4 is something like the following reasoning> if the elements of the observa-
tion space (E) have any patterns or regularities, then they can be encapsulated
in a law, on the basis of some hypothesis. The idea that the best law is that which
can extract and summarise the maximum amount of regularities or patterns in
E and represent them most concisely captures the workings of Occam￿ s Razor
in an inductive exercise. In homely terms: if two hypotheses can encapsulate
the patterns in the data, then choose the more concise one.
The ￿nal link in this inductive saga is a universal formula for the prior in
the inverse probability exercise.
Proposition 5 9 a probability measure m(:) that is universal (in the sense of
being invariant except for an inessential additive constant) such that:
log2 m(:) ￿ K (:) (4)
where, K (:): the Kolmogorov complexity of the best theory generated in the
implementation of the rule of induction.
I think this closes the circle consistently with the aims set forth in TPOS
for an inductive exercise. Thus, I rest my case for Jevons as an inductivist.
4 Concluding Notes
"[W]e may think of a system of inductive logic as a design for a
￿ learning machine￿ : that is to say, a design for a computing machine
that can extrapolate certain kinds of empirical regularities from the
data with which it is supplied."
[14], 1975 (1963), p.297.
I believe Jevons would have risen to the challenge of designing such a ma-
chine. He would have seen, quite immediately, that inductive logic is not simply
the inverse of deductive logic - just as it is no longer quite straightforward to
say that integration is simply the inverse of di⁄erentiation.
He would also have seen that his harsh strictures against the prescience
of Boole on the importance of the exclusive ￿ or, particularly for induction
11The problem of summing an in￿nite sum has to be resolved by some kind of standard
normalization procedure in the case, as here, of denumerable in￿nity of hypotheses. I shall
ignore this detail here.
10(but also for deduction), were slightly misplaced and unfair. This is only partly
because every proposition (in the predicate calculus) can be expressed as a string
made up of the negation of the exclusive ￿ or :
X OR ELSE Y ￿ (X _ Y ) ^ [￿ (X ^ Y )] ￿ (X^ ￿ Y ) _ (Y ^ ￿ X) (5)
The negation of (5), i.e, ￿ [(X^ ￿ Y ) _ (Y ^ ￿ X)], is a universal proposi-
tion ￿it can express every proposition (in the predicate calculus) as strings of
itself ￿in the same sense in which m(:) is a universal prior12. Even more impor-
tantly, every learning machine must include a component, in its architecture, to
enable it to identify such a string, so long as the proposition is non-trivial. That
Jevons did not realize the signi￿cance of the exclusive ￿ or implied, naturally,
that he could not even begin to think of a ￿ design for a learning machine￿ , and
thereby could not harness his considerable experience in constructing deductive
logic machines to implement a mechanical design for any system of inductive
logic.
On the other hand, Jevons had the insights of the pioneer to see the impor-
tance of the ￿ method of classi￿cation￿(see §2, above) ￿i.e., the construction of
the Tree of Poryphry or the Ramean Tree (TPOS, pp. 702-4) ￿in both deductive
and inductive exercises. The standard method for constructing a computable
approximation of K (:) completely vindicates Jevons￿ s dim but clear perceptions
on the combinatorial complexities of constructing such trees. He observed, quot-
ing Jeremy Bentham￿ s results, that there are ￿ two objections to the extensive
use of the method of "bifurcate classi￿cation" [i.e., constructing the Ramean
Tree]￿ :
"(1). [T]hey soon become impracticably extensive and unwieldy, and
(2) [T]hey are uneconomical."
TPOS, p. 704.
This observation is given precise quantitative con￿rmation within the frame-
work of the modern theory of induction13. These are the two most important
reasons for the practical, i.e., empirical, infeasibility ￿intractability ￿of perfect
induction. The construction of a Ramean Tree, or any formal object that is its
analytical equivalent, is necessary if perfect induction is to be the starting point.
But, then, there was also his uncritical faith in the law of the excluded
middle ￿tertium non datur ￿in all formal reasoning, whether constrained or
unconstrained by untamable in￿nities (despite lip service to ￿ we, with our ￿nite
minds and short experience￿ ). He could not have foreseen the havoc Brouwer was
12Or, in the same sense in which there are Universal Turing Machines or Universal Dy-
namical Systems.
13Constructing an absolutely minimum Ramean Tree is, in the technical terms of modern
applied recursion theory ￿in particular computational complexity theory ￿an NP-Complete
Problem. But Jevons￿ s perceptive insight was mixed, as almost as always, with his penchant
for rushing into unwarranted technical conclusions. There is, in fact, an e⁄ective rule ￿in the
strict formal sense of recursion theory, see, for example, [5], chapter 7, §7.11 ￿to construct
such an absolute minimum; it is just that it is nor computationally tractable. Jeremy Benthan
was exactly right; Jevons, again sadly, ￿ as usual￿ , only almost right, bordering on being wrong!
11about to unleash on an unsuspecting community of deductivists in mathematical
logic and a variety of formalists and logicists. I give this as an example of an
infelicity in Jevons￿ s faith in the power of mathematical logic for two reasons.
Firstly, even although he was admirably aware of combinatorial complexities
￿we may, today, be more used to calling it ￿ the curse of dimensionality￿￿he
did not pay due care to the paradoxes of extrapolating from the ￿nite to the
in￿nite in logic and mathematics. Secondly, the tertium non datur was one of
the three foundations on which the laws of thought were constructed. But it was
never made clear ￿in TPOS ￿whether the laws of thought are subject to the
laws of nature, or vice versa. These may well be the reasons he never realised,
in any of his logical works, that logic had appropriated reasoning processes
from mathematics, in an era before Boole and De Morgan tried to go in the
other direction. Once again, it was left to the post-Boole and post-De Morgan
generation to make this explicit ￿but that was too late for Jevons.
I remain puzzled that Ockham does not even receive a passing nod in TPOS.
But I also think he would have found that Occam￿ s Razor provides an anchor to
determine, uniquely, the inductive hypothesis. Above all ￿in classic ￿ counter-
factual￿vein ￿I surmise that he would have been an enthusiast of modern recur-
sion theory and, hence, would have seen the possibilities of formalising, exactly,
the processes of inductive inference. I attach some metaphysical signi￿cance
to the fact that both Jevons and Turing ￿tragically robbed of long-lives, both
of them ￿were, for some signi￿cant part of their respective lives, ￿ Manchester
men￿! I have often speculated on the nature and content of an imaginary dia-
logue between the author of14 ￿ On a General System of Numerically De￿nite
Reasoning￿and the author, 66 years later of, ￿ On Computable Numbers, with
an Application to the Entscheidungsproblem￿([19]) ￿Turing as a colleague in
Jevons￿ s time, context and traditions, and vice versa! So far as I know, there is
no record of turing having been inspired by the various Jevonian logic machines,
or that he even knew of its existence.
In his contributions to business cycle theory, Jevons￿ s reliance on the (linear)
superposition principle and, hence, over-enthusiasm for the explanatory power
of ￿ forced oscillations￿(in linear dynamical systems) to explain and describe the
nascent facts of the decennial cycle of industrial activity,was one of his most seri-
ous infelicities. This was a further manifestation of rushed conclusions, based on
imperfect perceptions and understandings of general laws and constraints, mis-
taking particular mathematical and logical laws for permanent truths. Against
the backdrop provided by the discussion in this paper,I believe Keynes￿ s pithy
characterization of TPOS is easy to concur with:
"Combining insight and error, he spoilt brilliant suggestions by er-
ratic and atrocious arguments. His application of inverse probability
to the inductive problem is crude and fallacious, but the idea which
underlies it is substantially good. ... There are few books, so super-
￿cial in argument yet suggesting so much as Jevons￿ s Principles of




In the ￿eld of mathematical logic and applied mathematics ￿even in real
analysis ￿no era could have been worse for a man of insight and conviction,
on the importance of these ￿elds for epistemology and methodology ￿than the
precise one in which he studied and tried to develop the subjects for application.
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